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n  March 2014, the Russian government—upon learning the people of Crimea 
voted overwhelmingly by a referendum to secede from Ukraine—announced that 
it would annex the territory.  The international community was shocked.  United 
States Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the move as a revival of 
outmoded power politics: “You don’t just in the 21
st
 century behave in 19
th
 
century fashion by invading another country on a completely trumped-up 
pretext.”
1
  This paper argues that, even by earlier standards in international 
politics, this move by Russia would be considered illegitimate or imprudent.  By 
looking at the incident through the natural law theories of Thomas Hobbes and 
Emer de Vattel, the annexation would be considered imprudent: by the former 
because it threatens domestic harmony and is completely illegitimate, and by the 
latter because it is a blatant violation of the rights of the Ukrainian polity.  In 
order to properly understand the relationship among polities, it is necessary first 
to determine how each philosopher qualified and defined a polity.  Subsequently, 
I shall outline possible arguments for why Russia may legitimately annex the 
Crimea before refuting these claims.  The paper shall then conclude with a survey 
of possible solutions by which the international dilemma may be resolved.  The 
issue of legitimate expansion of a polity’s land is one of the oldest dilemmas in 
international natural law theory.  By examining the tradition of early modern 
thinkers, it may be readily demonstrated that the recent Russian annexation does 
not meet the criteria set forth by Hobbes and Vattel. 
 
Modern natural law theory is a branch of philosophy which deals with the 
relations among polities on the international stage, in regard to commerce, war, 
alliance, and other concepts germane to the dealings of states with one another.  
This may be distinguished from earlier traditions of international law in that it 
tended to rely less on Thomastic and Aristotelian models of earlier ages. The 
primary sources I draw from in this paper are Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan and 
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Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations.  Both works describe the relationships 
between the individual and the polity, as well as how polities should behave on 
the international stage. 
 
Thomas Hobbes: The Role of the Polity 
 
There is perhaps no other political philosopher more famous than Thomas 
Hobbes, but perhaps also not one more misunderstood: Hobbes’ thought 
experiment of the state of nature is meant not to expound upon the natural evil of 
man (an idea that Hobbes himself did not espouse), but to explain the purpose and 
role of political society or the state.  Hobbes’ thoughts regarding the state of 
nature (a condition which lacks political society) is often quoted: “there is no 
place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain . . .and the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”
2
  The second half of the quote is more 
memorable, but the first half is more important to Hobbes.  Each man has “natural 
right” or the ability to act in whatever way is conducive to his self-preservation.
3
  
Although natural right contributes to the dismal state of nature because there is no 
common judge to whom natural man may appeal, it is ultimately an epistemic 
dilemma—uncertainty—that creates the brutishness of the natural condition.  Man 
is not evil, but he is distrustful.  It is by nature that man lacks common signs by 
which he may communicate and overcome this wariness.
4
  Language itself is 
antagonistic to mutual trust (a point which is to be contended by Vattel).  For 
Hobbes, no objects necessarily have names—it is by an arbiter’s rule that men 
agree on common definitions.
5
  For example, the paper upon which this text is 
read is only known to everyone as paper because some central authority has 
declared it to be such.
6
  Unlike in Aristotle’s theory, there are no “essences” of 
things.  Natural man does not know whether his neighbor is an enemy or ally, and 
thus he lives in a state of constant contention or war. 
 
The commonwealth is the solution to this problem; the Leviathan, or 
sovereign, becomes the judge and defines terms, dispels distrust, and ultimately 
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ensures the stability of the polity so that man may pursue industry.  Hobbes 
expounds upon the rights of a sovereign, most importantly the sovereign’s right to 
arbitrate: “sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions 
and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace.”
7
  The sovereign defines 
terms—he creates a common language by which the citizens of the 
commonwealth may communicate.  The vocabulary, shared by all those in the 
polity, becomes the foundation for industry and the means by which natural 
distrust is surmounted.  Man is guided to this condition of civil society by natural 
laws—precepts “found out by reason” which dictate that man must seek peace.
8
  
In order for civil society to properly function, however, all constituents must lay 
down their natural right before the sovereign, who would retain his natural right.
9
  
This may seem excessive in that the citizens have no claim against the sovereign, 
while the sovereign may have unlimited power against the citizens.  Indeed, prima 
facie, this seems true—but the Hobbesian model does make important exceptions.  
Citizens still maintain the right to self-preservation, an inalienable right which 
would limit the role of the Leviathan in international relations.  
 
The Hobbesian Polity in International Relations 
  
Hobbes, to a certain extent, maintains that sovereign nations in the 
international realm continue to exist in a state of nature—but with important 
qualifications. It then may be said that the Russian annexation of the Crimea is an 
act of natural right; Russia may annex the Crimea merely because Russia is able 
to annex.  Although this is true in the Hobbesian scheme, it is still to be 
considered imprudent and foolhardy.  While the Leviathan wields absolute power, 
it should wield it with a clear purpose in mind: the sustaining of itself and, as 
corollary, the sustaining of its people.  Domestic matters must check international 
matters even for the sovereign.   
 
The state of nature which exists among individuals is similar to the state of 
nature which exists among nations in that there is no common judge and nations 
retain natural right in regard to one another.  The different polities in the 
international realm acknowledge no common ruler; their conduct is still dictated 
by natural right and resembles still the state of nature: “Persons of Soveraigne 
authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the 
state of and posture of Gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes 
fixed on one another.”
10
  That disputing parties have no redress other than by 
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force may come under scrutiny in the modern day.  Supranational bodies such as 
the United Nations and International Monetary Fund may serve as examples 
against this proposition.  These bodies, however, cannot be considered a 
commonwealth by which nations leave the state of nature.  These bodies, though 
instituted by member nations, lack the force characteristic of a Leviathan—the 
ability to enforce decrees and promulgations: “Covenants, without the Sword,” 
Hobbes argues, “are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”
11
  
These international bodies cannot enforce their own wills in the same manner that 
domestic governments may enforce their own wills upon their respective 
populaces.  It follows then that polities still have the right to act in whatever 
manner may best serve their self-preservation. 
 
It must be acknowledged that the state of nature among individuals is not a 
complete analogue to the international anarchy; unlike the condition among 
individuals in which the agents are whole, the natural condition of states is such 
that agents are conglomerations. Individuals in a state of nature have only to 
worry about external threats—e.g. other humans, natural disasters, food shortages, 
etc.  Polities, on the other hand, must worry not only about external threats (other 
polities), but also internal dissention.  The internal worries which a sovereign 
faces in its own citizenry is a topic explored by several modern scholars: “as a 
corporate body, the sovereign must consider the relationship between its external 
relations and relations with its own citizens.”
12
  Hobbes, to a certain extent, 
acknowledges this dilemma by granting the subjects of the Leviathan the right of 
disobedience under circumstances in which the Leviathan is no longer able to 
provide protection: “The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to 
last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect 
them.”
13
  The sovereign ceases to be a sovereign (thereby losing legitimacy to 
command subjects) when he no longer is able to protect his subjects.  This may be 
extended to the idea that if a sovereign acts in such a way as to endanger his 
subjects, it is permissible to dethrone the sovereign.
14
  The fate of a Leviathan, 
then, is tied to that of his subjects; to neglect or abuse them would spell his own 
demise—this factor would play an important role in the relationships among 
polities. 
 
Vain expansion and interdependence among polities are two other limits 
on the Leviathan’s natural right in the international realm.  Vain expansion of 
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territorial holdings is a factor that may lead to the dissolution of the 
commonwealth; Hobbes refers to “the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of enlarging 
Dominion” that can lead to a commonwealth’s demise.
15
  The polity may expand 
because of the necessities of self-preservation, but to do so vainly—to expand to 
such an extent that it exposes the state to foreign invasion or dissent from new 
subjects in the polity—is to lead to the polity’s own destruction.  Caution must be 
attendant upon expanding borders.  Additionally, Hobbes also makes the case 
that—to some degree—states depend on one another: “because there is no 
Territory under the Dominion of one Commonwealth . . .that produceth all things 
needful for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body . . . [a Territory can] 
supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad.”
16
  
There should be trade among Leviathans, if only out of the material necessities of 
human existence.  A Hobbesian kind of commerce, however, remains always 
imperfect because there is no common judge to adjudicate in the case of 
altercation or controversy.  A case may be made to state that Hobbes is proposing 
a stronger claim—that the Leviathan should actively seek out commercial 
activities: “to the extent conditions for international trade can be created and 
sustained by governments, it is for governments to create and sustain them.”
17
 
Nevertheless, trade must be a consideration that limits a Leviathan’s natural right. 
 
One should recognize, however, that—though the Hobbesian Leviathan is 
limited in international relations—these limitations are mainly in regards to 
domestic, not international, concerns.  The historical context of Hobbes is the 
English Civil War.  It is therefore not surprising that he places such importance on 
domestic matters.  Nevertheless, Hobbes lacks any idea of a cosmopolis or 
suprapolitical commonwealth among men which would dictate certain norms or 
define certain relationships (as would be seen in Vattel’s works).  The 
commonwealth exists so that its citizens may exist outside the brutish state of 
nature—its relationships with other commonwealths, and indeed all of its actions, 
should be dictated by this purpose.  Its obligations, treaties, or other pursuits 
including trade or conquest must be undertaken insofar as they contribute to the 
stability and well-being of the domestic situation in the commonwealth.  The 
natural right of the state, which may have no real limitation in the sense that a 
violation would not be punished, must be limited reasonably so that the Leviathan 
may fulfill this purpose.   
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Hobbes in Crimea 
 
The adverse response by the international community to the Russian 
annexation has unnecessarily threatened the existence of the Russian polity.  The 
United States, as well as the European Union, have initiated economic sanctions, 
and credit agencies have downgraded Russian bonds.
18
  This backlash against the 
Russian polity would invariably limit domestic prosperity.  International lending 
is essential to any polity and, although it is of a financial nature, Hobbes would 
likely consider this resource to be a commodity essential to the proper functioning 
of state.  Even the Russian Finance Minister acknowledged that, because of the 
flight of capital from the country, economic growth for the year may halt.
19
  The 
economic sanctions, currently nominal, also fall under this same category and 
may be expanded in the future to cover more Russian companies and people.  
These economic hindrances would likely be considered bulimia under the 
Hobbesian scheme; the state is expanding to such an extent that it is becoming  
detrimental to the citizens of the polity.   
 
The solution to this dilemma, according to a Hobbesian model, is 
complicated and difficult because of the discrepancy that exists between natural 
right and natural law.  Hobbes states that the natural laws are derived from reason, 
and that the fundamental and first law is: “to seek Peace, and follow it.”
20
  The 
natural laws are essential to form the polity, and—because man realizes a more 
peaceful and better condition in the polity than in nature—therefore essential to 
man’s prospering.  Natural right, on the other hand, states that man may do 
anything to preserve himself.  The two come into contention in the state of nature, 
where uncertainty prevents peace.  The Leviathan, i.e. the submitting of natural 
right to a commonwealth, is the solution to the state of nature among individuals, 
but not polities.  The same principles, then, that hinder Russia from expanding 
also hinder other nations from checking Russian expansion.  Ultimately, the 
Hobbesian would argue that Russia must cease expansion because of the resulting 
domestic incommodities.  It may be speculative, but—given the recent expansion 
of Russia and the precedent for international annexation without international 
consent—the Hobbesian may be forced to state that, for the interest of all 
Leviathans being able to control their respective populaces, it would be beneficial 
to restrain Russia in some manner.  Whether or not this would be done by means 
of force with war, or economic sanctions, the Hobbesian tradition would seem to 
remain silent.  This Hobbesian model, unless a more in-depth analysis of all other 
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Emer de Vattel: The Role of the Polity 
 
Emer de Vattel differs primarily from Hobbes in that he defines the 
constitution and fundamental laws as the foundation of the polity.  Unlike 
Hobbes, who begins his thesis from a state of nature, Vattel already assumes their 
ascension from the natural condition.   
 
The purpose of polity in Vattel’s model is the perfection of man.  Vattel 
has a much more optimistic outlook on both nature and man; he does not suffer 
from (or recognize) the natural uncertainty which Hobbes posits: 
 
We see  . . . that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength 
and natural weapons of defense which she has furnished other animals,—
having in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of 
speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by intercourse 
with their fellow-creates. Speech enables them to communicate with each 





The mutual mistrust which exists in the Hobbesian state of nature does not exist in 
Vattel’s model.  Nature has not made man naturally mighty because she has made 
him naturally sociable.   A sign of this sociability is speech by which people may 
naturally understand one another. Unlike Hobbes who views language as a 
hindrance to man’s ability to organize into groups, Vattel views language as an 
indication of man’s sociable nature.  Vattel’s conception of society additionally 
requires mutual assistance: “each individual should do for others everything 
which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the 
duty he owes to himself.”
23
 Vattel also conceived of a polity itself as an individual 
because it may contract, deliberate, and make resolutions.
24
  An individual has an 
obligation to others; this is a concept which, with some exceptions, would also be 
applied to the realm of international relations. 
 
Emer de Vattel: The Polity in International Relations 
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In international relations, there exists equality among polities—a notion 
which stems from Vattel’s intellectualist beliefs regarding free will.  The 
Hobbesian model, with important limitations regarding domestic tranquility, 
grants to polities natural right.  Vattel’s model limits this by stating that, once 
established, polities are on equal footing because each polity pursues its own 
concept of self-perfection.  This idea finds its roots in an intellectualist tradition 
which held that the only way to act freely is to act in accordance with nature.
25
  
Self-perfection, the goal of every polity, can be attained only if nations act freely.  
Since a polity cannot both act by reason and by compulsion (i.e. by another 
nation), it follows that a compelled nation cannot be a reasonable nation.  
Freedom and reason are one; a compelled nation cannot be a free nation.
26
  
Reason, in these circumstances, must be defined by the polity itself.  For example, 
if one state views slavery as unreasonable (and therefore outlaws it), while 
another state views the same kind of slavery as reasonable (and therefore does not 
outlaw it), both states would be acting reasonably.  By using this line of 
argumentation, the best policy regarding international relations is non-interference 
because to interfere would mean to hinder another nation’s self-perfection.  
 
This idea of non-interference plays an important role in Vattel’s concept 
of a cosmopolis, literally translated: “world city,” but better understood as “global 
community.”  Non-interference is the minimum requirement of a Vatteline polity 
in the international realm.  It is necessary not only that polities refrain from 
unwarranted aggression, it is also necessary that they help one another in each 
other’s achieving self-perfection—provided that aiding others does not hinder the 
aiding polity’s own perfection.  Just as individuals congregate into polities for 
each other’s mutual benefit, so too should such a symbiotic relationship exist 
among polities.  Vattel writes that even the glory, or reputation, of other polities 
must be a consideration when acting on the international stage: “the duty of a 
nation extends even to the glory of other nations.”
27
  Vattel is, however, sensitive 
to the harsh realities of political landscapes.  A polity may refuse to help another 
polity, should this run contrary to its own perfection: “and if [the polity refuses] to 
comply, their determination is to be patiently acquiesced in.”
28
  It is up to the 
polity itself whether aiding another polity is in its own interest.  This may be said 
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to be an imperfect duty—in that it should be done, but failure to perform should 
not be punished. Vattel’s spectrum, then, has two extremities.  On the one hand, 
the international realm may become an almost world state (at least in idea) where 
different polities assist one another in their respective goals.  On the other hand, 
the international realm may devolve into a collection of isolated states—no nation 
helping any other nation because each nation determines it to be against their own 
perfection.  Vattel, an advocate of commerce, would likely favor the former over 
the latter.
29
   Nevertheless, either circumstance results from the necessary equality 
of polities, and neither circumstance advocates aggression or expansion. 
 
Vattel in Crimea 
 
The equality of all states has another corollary in Vattel’s system; a state 
may not interfere in the affairs of another state unless asked.  Vattel abhors the 
typical imperialistic argument for expanding the polity to expand civilization: 
“though a nation be obliged to promote . . .the perfection of others,” he writes, “it 
is not entitled to forcibly obtrude these good offices on them.”
30
 The arguments of 
spreading culture or religion to “barbarians” or “heathens” is an old justification 
for the expansion of states.  Oftentimes, however, this may be merely a façade to 
exploit native peoples for material gain.  Two polities may engage with one 
another only if both polities consent.  A contemporary example of this would be 
the cultural exchange program scholarships such as the Fulbright Scholarships or 
the Marshall Scholarships—in both cases, the two polities engage consensually 
and to each other’s mutual benefit.  This concept is so rigorous that, unless 
prompted, a polity may not interfere in the affairs of another even in the case of 
what contemporary society would consider human rights violations.  The only 
reason for just war or military conflict is the violation of rights—and this may be 
pursued only by the injured party.
31
 In regard to Russia, since it has not suffered 
any sort of injury, nor has Ukraine consented to any interference, the annexation 
would be illegitimate.  
 
Vattel does acknowledge that polities may justly use force in international 
politics for the sake of annexation; three possible scenarios in which annexation 
would be legitimate are: 1) for the sake of cultivation of land; 2) because of laws 
of necessity; and 3) intervention in civil war.  None of these three can be justified 
in the Crimean annexation. 
 
The most primitive reason for which a polity may legitimately expand is to 
cultivate more land, thus allowing a more commodious existence for mankind as a 
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whole; today, this would be a ludicrous basis for Russian expansion. Vattel 
justifies the existence of property as a means by which man may better sustain 
himself: “when the human race became extremely multiplied, the earth was no 
longer capable of furnishing spontaneously . . .it therefore became necessary that 
those tribes should fix themselves somewhere, and appropriate to themselves 
portions of land, in order that they might . . .apply themselves and render those 
lands fertile, and thence derive their subsistence.”
32
  Polities are able to expand to 
uncultivated lands so that the land could better be utilized and provide more food 
for mankind.   
 
This is an argument perhaps unique to the early modern period in which 
large plots of land (e.g. in the un-European settled lands of the New World) 
remained near to a state of nature. This argument, in the case of Russia, is no 
longer relevant.  Before Russian annexation, culture and civilization had already 
existed in the Crimea.  The land had been home (and still is) to Ukrainians and 
other ethnic groups.  In a condition of extreme material scarcity, it is permissible 
that a polity use force to meet this necessity; the polity in need, however, must 
offer more peaceful measures before resorting to outright force.  The earth is 
designed in such a way to provide sustenance for all its inhabitants.  If a nation 
finds herself in an “absolute want of provisions, she may compel her neighbors, 
who have more than they want for themselves, to supply her with a share of them 
at a fair price: she may even take it by force, if they will not sell.”
33
  The 
resources in question may be considered food or even women (citizen 
reproduction is essential to the sustaining of a nation); the important distinction, 
however, must be made that commercial overtures are necessary before resorting 
to force.  Russia has made no such negotiations.  Additionally, the law of 
necessity pertains only to movable goods, not to immovable goods (property).  
The law of necessity, then, may be seen as a temporary solution; it is meant only 
for immediate sustenance and cannot be invoked infinitely.  In Vattel’s scheme, 
the annexation of the Crimea would represent a use of brute force which does not 
respect the equality among nations.   
 
The most convincing argument which Russia may offer in its annexation 
is the argument that, since the Ukraine is in a state of civil war, two separate 
polities emerge and it is justified to interfere at the behest of those asking for help; 
this, however, fundamentally misunderstands and cheapens Vattel’s concept of 
state.  According to some, the Crimean referendum in March 2014, which resulted 
in a 97% approval rate for joining Russia, serves as the grounds for Russia’s 
acquisition of the peninsula.
34
  A glib analysis of Vattel’s works may justify this, 
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not as a mere separatist movement of malcontents, but as the creation of a new 
state which may, because of equality of nations, determine its own means to 
perfection.
35
  However, the reality of the situation places doubt on the legitimacy 
of the referendum itself, which some observers claim was rigged.
36
   
 
Nevertheless, even if there had been no doubts about the referendum’s 
legitimacy, Vattel would still doubt that this single action would constitute the 
creation of a polity.  A polity may only separate itself into two in dire extremities: 
“it ought to be attempted only in cases of extremity, when the public misery is 
raised to such a height that people may say with Tacitus, miseram pacem vel bello 
bene mutari [a miserable pace is exchanged well for war].”
37
  This is a 
circumstance similar to the one Hobbes imagines in that rebellion is permissible 
only when the polity is no longer able to sustain order.  Notably, Ukraine still had 
troops in the peninsula at the time Russia declared the annexation; there had not 
been any anarchy.  Additionally, the creation of any new state requires a 
constitution—an important document which determines the manner in which a 
state may perfect itself.  The creation of such an outline would require much time 
and contemplation; a referendum, organized in such a short time, cannot 
reasonably be considered a constitution.  Since the Crimea cannot be considered 
its own polity, it is still part of the Ukrainian commonwealth.  This expansion is 
an illegitimate invasion of a neighboring country; this kind of acquisition has no 
basis in natural law.
38 
 
Vattel offers two possible solutions to international dilemmas in which 
there is an unlicensed use of force: complete annihilation of the aggressor or 
economic sanctions.  Vattel writes that nations which would make war without 
any reason are “enemies to the human race, in the same manner as, in civil society 
professed assassins and incendiaries,” and that “all nations have a right to join in a 
public confederacy for the purpose of punishing and even exterminating those 
savage nations.”
39
  It is unlikely that Vattel would advocate this measure for the 
situation in the Crimea.  Although the expansion of Russia seems to stem from 
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illegitimate reasons, the crime is not so great and so senseless as to warrant the 
destruction of an entire polity.  Instead, Vattel would likely advocate for 
commercial sanctions: “the balance of power could be stabilized if it operated 
primarily through a process of commercial preferences and restrictions.”
40
  This is 
perhaps the most peaceful way to resolve conflict.  States—established as 
legitimate—must maintain their legitimacy by keeping in check the polities which 
violate the cosmopolis.  This too is the typical way in which modern polities 
respond to military aggression (and indeed, it is also the option chosen by the 
United States and European Union in this particular incident)—it is a testament to 





The world of international politics is one of immense potential.  On the 
one hand, every day, nations contribute to each other’s perfections—by means of 
exchange, whether commercial, cultural, or technological.  On the other hand, 
polities continue to exist in uncertainty.  There is no common power to adjudicate, 
with finality, any international disputes.  Both of these concepts—a cosmopolis of 
mutual benefit and an international anarchy which resembles a state of nature—
were present in the writings of the early modern writers.  Both Hobbes and Vattel 
wrote of peace as the final objective of human existence.  Natural law was the 
means by which man might achieve this end.  The two political thinkers, however, 
approached the means to peace differently.  
 
 Hobbes looked at domestic concerns as a limiting factor of the Leviathan 
on the international stage.  Vattel conceived of an international community which 
itself would limit any transgressions against natural law.  The Russian annexation 
of the Crimea would represent a violation of natural law for both of these 
thinkers.  Although the infamous Iron Curtain between the Communist East and 
Capitalist West has long fallen, there is a new division in the region: between the 
western European Union and the Russian economic bloc.  Instances such as the 
Crimean annexation indubitably exacerbate the divide.  Proper reflection is 
required in thinking about contemporary international politics, and indeed, there is 
a long, centuries-old tradition to consider.  With the advent of the modern state, 
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